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ABSTRACT  
Can labor emigration form part of a state’s foreign policy goals? The relevant literature 
links emigration to states’ developmental needs, which does not explain why some states 
choose to economically subsidize their citizens’ emigration. This article explores for the 
first time the soft power importance of high-skilled emigration from authoritarian 
emigration states. It finds that the Egyptian state under Gamal Abdel Nasser employed 
labor emigration for two distinct purposes linked to broader soft power interests: first, as 
an instrument of cultural diplomacy to spread revolutionary ideals of Arab unity and anti-
imperialism across the Middle East; second, as a tool for disseminating development aid, 
particularly in Yemen and sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on Arabic and non-Arabic 
primary sources, the article identifies the interplay between foreign policy and cross-
border mobility, while also sketching an evolving research agenda on authoritarian 
emigration states’ policy-making. 
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Introduction 
Can labor emigration form part of a state’s foreign policy goals? In particular, how do 
authoritarian states use labor emigration in their foreign policy-making? The emerging 
academic literature on the politics of international migration has yet to fully explore this 
phenomenon as a separate field of inquiry. In the case of Egypt, the state developed an 
emigration policy that subsidized the short-term emigration of high-skilled professionals, 
who were also loyal supporters of the ruling regime, across the Arab world and Africa. 
This goes against existing theorization on states’ engagement with emigration in two 
ways: firstly, states are expected to develop labor emigration policies according to their 
developmental aims, primarily seeking to accrue migrant remittances; however, the 
Egyptian case demonstrates how authoritarian states may also be willing to financially 
support the emigration of high-skilled citizens. Secondly, comparative politics research 
links emigration in authoritarian contexts to the ‘exit’ of political dissenters; yet, the case 
of Egypt highlights how thousands of regime followers were also willing to emigrate 
abroad in support of the state’s foreign policy goals. A closer analysis of ‘authoritarian 
emigration states’ is needed in order to fully comprehend the politics of cross-border 
mobility in non-democratic contexts. This includes the export of Cuban medical staff 
under the Fidel Castro regime or the dispatch of Russian scientific staff across the Soviet 
Union. Beyond Cold War politics, China’s ‘no-strings-attached’ development policy 
currently involves the dispatch of hundreds of thousands of workers, advisors, and 
technicians employed in aid and construction projects abroad, particularly in Africa. 
This article aims to shed light on the motivation of authoritarian emigration states for 
promoting their citizens’ cross-border mobility, in an attempt to move beyond political 
economy and comparative politics paradigms that dominate the field. I argue that they 
may employ high-skilled labor emigration as an instrument of soft power towards host 
states for two distinct foreign policy purposes, namely cultural diplomacy and bilateral aid 
dissemination. In the case of Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–1970), 
the sending state employed regional emigration of Egyptian professionals as a tool of 
cultural diplomacy in order to disseminate ideas of anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism, and 
Egyptian-led pan-Arabism across the Arab world; it also employed emigration as an 
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instrument of bilateral aid dissemination, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and in the 
case of Yemen. In these practices of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Arab and African 
states’ citizens, Egypt came into direct competition with the conservative Arab 
monarchies that felt threatened by Nasser’s popularity and pan-Arab rhetoric, as well as 
Israel, which was also organizing the dispatch of professionals abroad as an instrument of 
bilateral aid. Beyond its contribution to the interplay of cross-border mobility and 
authoritarian states’ foreign policy, the article also contributes to a more nuanced 
understanding of the importance of migration in conflictual intra-Arab relations and the 
Arab–Israeli conflict, as well as the interaction of soft and hard power in the broader 
context of the international relations of the Middle East. 
I employ a single-case-study methodology for two reasons: first, it may provide a 
challenge to existing theoretical paradigms, paving the way for future large-N studies. In 
this instance, I argue for the foreign policy importance of high-skilled emigration within 
the context of authoritarian states. In particular, I demonstrate how authoritarian 
emigration states may engage in high-skilled labor emigration not for regime export but 
for soft power purposes of cultural diplomacy and bilateral aid dissemination. Despite the 
pitfalls of selecting cases on the dependent variable, a significant body of political science 
work highlights how ‘in the early stages of a research program, selection on the 
dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal 
paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest’ (George and Bennett, 
2005: 23). This is the case with Egypt, which constitutes a ‘crucial,’ albeit not a ‘hard’ case 
in terms of its relevance to the article’s theoretical construct (Gerring, 2007), given its 
historical centrality as the main exporter of migrant labor in the Middle East and one of 
the largest recipients of remittances globally (Tsourapas, 2015), as well as its character as 
an authoritarian state. 
Second, the single-case format allows for the presentation of rich data on Egypt, 
particularly primary accounts that may be cited in full and inductively allow for theory 
development (George and Bennett, 2005: 111–112). Two hypotheses emerge based on 
existing data on the Egyptian historical case: Egyptian professionals’ emigration under 
Nasser served as a political instrument during the intra-Arab competition against 
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conservative monarchies (James, 2006; Kerr, 1978; Tsourapas, 2016); at the same time, 
high-skilled emigration formed part of its broader foreign assistance towards the 
developing world, particularly Yemen (Rahmy, 1981; Schmidt, 1968). Detailed evidence 
from primary sources will allow for a reformulation of these initial explanations into 
more general hypotheses, which may then be tested in a broader set of cases. As George 
and Bennett argue, ‘it is valid to develop a theory from a case and then test the theory 
against additional evidence from the case that was not used to derive the theory,’ as this 
enhances the theory’s falsifiability and ‘can circumvent confirmation biases’ (2005: 112). 
With regard to data collection, fieldwork in authoritarian contexts presents unique 
challenges, particularly in light of the fact that cross-border mobility is traditionally 
considered a security issue for Arab elites (Tsourapas, 2014). Research is further plagued 
by a lack of publicly available statistical data on intra-Arab flows, as well as by the fact 
that Egyptian migration management is handled at the highest levels of the executive. At 
the same time, the fact that this is a historical case study hinders the use of elite 
interviews. In light of an absence of readily available information on state policy or 
statistical data, I relied upon a meticulous collection of the coverage of Egyptian labor 
migration issues: I collected all references to issues of emigration in three main Egyptian 
newspapers (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Gumhuriya) and a number of other Egyptian sources, 
which featured fragments of policy analysis or statistical information. I also succeeded in 
gaining access to archival sources at the Ministry of Education in Cairo, which allowed 
for a more accurate understanding of the politics of Egyptian educational staff 
emigration. I sought to neutralize any bias in Egyptian data sources via triangulation with 
additional Western evidence, namely autobiographies and memoirs, material from the 
National Archives in London, and various Western media coverage of labor migration in 
the 1954–1970 period. Given the broader anti-Nasser climate across many Western states 
during this period, I assigned more weight to evidence drawn from first-hand accounts in 
instances of discrepancies or contradictions. 
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Authoritarian emigration states in international relations 
Labor emigration has been mainly examined through political economy and comparative 
politics analyses, neither of which has linked cross-border mobility to sending states’ 
foreign policy. For political economists, labor emigration policy is shaped by a state’s 
developmental needs, particularly with regard to attracting remittances (Kapur, 2010). 
Although this strand of literature identifies how cross-border mobility features in uneven 
relations between ‘developed (migration receiving) and less-developed (migration 
sending) countries’ (Hollifield, 2012: 366), it does not incorporate foreign policy matters 
in its analysis. At the same time, comparative political scientists examining emigration out 
of authoritarian contexts expect such flows to be dominated by regime dissenters seeking 
to ‘exit’ the sending state, rather than regime loyalists that may serve foreign policy 
purposes abroad (cf. Glasius, 2017). 
That is not to say that the foreign policy component of cross-border migration has been 
unexamined. Within the subfield of diaspora studies, Gamlen introduced the concept of 
the ‘emigration state’ to describe state institutions, practices, and mechanisms ‘protruding 
beyond their borders and impacting on a variety of extra-territorial groups’ (Gamlen, 
2008; cf. Hollifield, 2004). At the same time, a growing number of scholars theorize the 
foreign policy importance of diasporas, along two lines: one group of scholars employ 
diasporas as their unit of analysis, and theorizes on diasporas’ foreign policy 
repercussions for the sending state (King and Melvin, 2006; Koinova, 2012); a second 
group of scholars focus on the sending state, and how it is able to employ diaspora 
groups as lobbying instruments (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; cf. Shain and Barth, 2003). 
Yet, states’ rationale for their diaspora and labor emigration policies do not overlap (cf. 
Tsourapas, 2015): for instance, Israel’s diaspora policy towards Jewish Americans that 
form part of the Israel lobby in the USA does not imply the existence of a particular 
labor emigration policy. At the same time, there has been little attention paid to whether 
regime type matters in such policies (Koinova and Tsourapas, 2018; for an exception, see 
Mirilovic, 2016). 
This article presents a new perspective for the analysis of mobility across non-democratic 
contexts in international relations scholarship, aiming to shift debates beyond state–
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diaspora thinking and to put regime type to the forefront of analysis. I argue for the need 
to examine the workings of ‘authoritarian emigration states,’ namely the set of 
institutions, practices, and mechanisms regulating cross-border mobility developed within 
non-democratic contexts. How do foreign policy considerations feature in authoritarian 
emigration states’ strategies or, put differently, in their emigration diplomacy (Adamson 
and Tsourapas, 2018)? A number of empirical examples suggests how authoritarian 
emigration states may employ high-skilled emigration in their foreign policy agendas, 
including the export of Cuban medical professionals across Latin America, Africa, and 
the Middle East (Kirk and Erisman, 2009), or the dispatch of Russian scientists and 
bureaucrats across the Eastern bloc (Babiracki, 2015). How can this foreign policy aspect 
of authoritarian emigration states’ actions best be examined? 
In order to address this, I introduce the concept of ‘soft power’ to the study of migration 
and diaspora politics, with an empirical focus on the international politics of the Middle 
East. While a full analysis of the term is beyond the scope of this analysis (cf. 
Berenksoetter and Williams, 2007), this article’s conceptualization is reminiscent of 
Lukes’ third dimension of power or, as Nye puts it, ‘getting others to want the outcomes 
you want’ via co-option rather than coercion (Nye, 2004: 5). While soft power has yet to 
be associated with cross-border mobility, I argue that it allows a more accurate analysis of 
the foreign policy importance of high-skilled emigration for authoritarian states as an 
instrument of cultural diplomacy via academic and scientific exchanges (Nye, 2004: 44–
55), and facilitating the dissemination of developmental aid (Nye, 2004: 61–62). In the 
remainder of the article, I examine how soft power considerations shaped Egyptian labor 
emigration policy under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Beyond the interplay between 
Egyptian foreign and emigration policies, I also identify how soft power is not entirely 
benign nor detached from hard power in the international politics of the Middle East, as 
per Nye’s original theorization, but is closely associated with both military and economic 
power (cf. Schmidt, 2007). 
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Emigration and Egyptian soft power under Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954–1970 
How does labor migration feature in Egypt’s foreign policy in the 1954–1970 period? 
Egyptian emigration before 1970 was tightly regulated (Dessouki, 1982; Tsourapas, 
2015), with the notable exception of the encouragement of regional, short-term 
emigration of Egyptian professionals. Under the state’s secondment program (niẓa ̄m al-
i‘a ̄ra li-l-kha ̄rij), thousands of teachers (Table 1), doctors, nurses, and other professionals 
were dispatched according to the Nasserite regime’s wish to contribute to the 
development processes of neighboring Arab states. The state also aimed at spreading 
revolutionary ideas of anti-imperialism and Arab unity, or pan-Arabism, under Nasser’s 
leadership, by applying the regime’s dictum that ‘we should differentiate between Egypt 
as a state, and Egypt as a revolution’ (cf. James, 2006; Kerr, 1978). The Egyptian regime 
developed a number of propaganda instruments to spread revolutionary ideas across the 
Arab world – the most well-known being the Voice of the Arabs radio programs. That said, 
very little has yet been written about how short-term, high-skilled emigration 
complemented its foreign policy goals (cf. Tsourapas, 2016). 
Egypt’s regional foreign policy underwent a number of stages in the aftermath of the 
1952 Free Officers’ Revolution (Gordon, 1992). An initial phase of introspection and 
pre-occupation with expelling the British gradually gave way to a more cautious, albeit at 
times openly hostile, attitude towards the West. By the mid-1950s, Nasser was firmly in 
control of Egypt and empowered by the fortuitous results of the Suez Crisis two years 
later. He developed an Egypt-centered, pan-Arab rhetoric that combined ‘anti-
colonialism, Arab socialism and the ideal of Arab political union’ and reverberated across 
the Middle East (Dekmejian, 1971: 108–118; James, 2006). References to al-waḥda al-
‘arabiyya (Arab Unity) would increase after Egypt’s 1958 merger with Syria and the 
creation of the United Arab Republic (Jankowski, 2002: 27–39). This rhetoric was widely 
popular across the Middle East, but Arab masses’ enthusiasm for the ideas of Nasserism 
was not shared by elites in the conservative Arab monarchies. In particular, King Faisal, 
who in 1964 had replaced his brother Saud on the throne of Saudi Arabia, saw ‘Nasser’s 
pan-Arabism as a direct threat to the survival of the Sa’udi ruling group’ (Al-Rasheed, 
2010: 113). This tension between the Arab republics and the Arab monarchies, the so-
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called Arab Cold War (Kerr, 1978), culminated in Egyptian and Saudi support for 
opposing sides in the 1962–1970 Yemeni Civil War, which will be described below. 
 
Table 1. Egyptian teachers in Arab and other countries, 1953–1964. 
Year Teachers in Arab states 
1953–1954 580 
1955–1956 1198 
1958–1959 2696 
1961–1962 2948 
1962–1963 3512 
1963–1964 4615 
Source: Department of Secondment, Ministry of Education, Arab Republic of Egypt, 
2014. 
 
In this process of intra-Arab antagonism, the Egyptian regime was able to employ regional 
migration as an instrument of soft power, partly given the massive developmental needs 
that the Arab world faced at the time. In the twilight of British colonial rule over the 
region, there was a heightened need for trained professionals to staff new Arab states’ 
educational and bureaucratic machineries. In fact, in the era of decolonization, ‘mass 
popular education was one of the first tasks which the new governments set themselves’ 
(Hourani, 2013: 389). Under Nasser, the Egyptian state was able to take advantage of this 
historical conjuncture. In fact, while labor emigration under Nasser was heavily restricted 
and regulated through a variety of formal and informal bureaucratic obstacles, regional 
high-skilled emigration constituted the notable exception to this (Tsourapas, 2016). This 
form of migration, particularly of Egyptian educators, was framed in political terms: as al-
Gumhuriya reported, ‘Egypt believes that it is her duty to help her sister Arab states to 
develop their education and learning … and that this development will not be achieved 
unless Egypt supplies these states with their needs for teachers at any cost’ (al-Gumhuriya, 
1957). 
Very little evidence exists on the nature of the process of selection and training, and even 
archival material on this is fragmentary (see Table 2). Yet one is able to gain a better 
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understanding through published sources, governmental documents, and various first-
hand accounts: Charles Cremeans, for instance, a British teacher working in the Arab 
world at the time, wrote that Egyptians were ‘indoctrinated before going to their foreign 
posts and are instructed to act as representatives of their country and its policies’ 
(Cremeans, 1963: 41). Egyptian ministries prepared ‘training seminars’ to teachers aiming 
to ‘acquaint them with the countries that they will be serving at’ and ‘to enlighten them’ 
(United Arab Republic, 1964: 5). Dessouki has also written on how those aiming to be 
seconded abroad needed to have no criminal record, and to expressly state that they 
would ‘not work with an agency openly hostile to Egypt or its national interest [or] 
undermine the development goals of Egypt’ (1982: 62). 
But why was this a soft power strategy for the Egyptian regime, rather than merely 
another instance of economically driven labor emigration? For one, this was a very costly 
process for the Egyptian state: with regard to Egyptian teachers, the Ministry of 
Education was typically responsible for their salaries while they were abroad (Tsourapas, 
2016). At the same time, as Table 2 demonstrates, host states appeared to be selected on 
the basis of close relations with Egypt: for instance, the deterioration of relations 
between Egypt and Jordan or Iraq led to the cancellation of secondment provisions for 
those countries. More importantly, the short-term emigration of Egyptian professionals, 
particularly teachers, was allowed despite severe domestic shortages: according to an eye-
witness account, ‘the export of teachers was a sacrifice to Egyptians … up and down the 
Nile valley, it is common sight to see Egyptian schoolrooms empty for lack of teachers’ 
(Wynn, 1959: 136). Numerous reports also point to the heavy politicization of these 
Egyptians abroad, who would ‘take with them the flame of Nasser-type nationalism’ 
(Wynn, 1959: 137). It is not accidental that the Egyptian state published lists of teachers 
selected for service abroad in the main newspapers, as an act of valorization (see al-
Ahram, 1956). The following section examines in detail how this form of migration was 
aimed at promoting Egyptian cultural diplomacy goals across the region. 
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Table 2. Egyptian teachers seconded to Arab states by destination (1953–1962). 
Country 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Saudi Arabia 206 293 401 500 454 551 727 866 1027 
Jordan - 8 20 31 56 - - - - 
Lebanon 25 25 39 36 75 111 251 131 104 
Kuwait 114 180 262 326 395 435 490 480 411 
Bahrain 15 15 18 25 25 25 26 28 36 
Morocco - - - 20 75 81 175 210 334 
Sudan - - - - 580 632 673 658 653 
Qatar - 1 3 5 8 14 17 18 24 
Libya 55 114 180 219 217 232 228 391 231 
Yemen - 12 11 8 17 17 17 14 0 
Iraq 76 112 121 136 63 449 - - - 
Palestine 13 32 34 37 46 120 166 175 165 
Somalia - - 25 23 57 69 90 109 213 
Source: Department of Secondment, Ministry of Education, Arab Republic of Egypt, 
2014). 
 
High-skilled emigration and Egyptian cultural diplomacy 
Broadly, a strategy of cultural diplomacy developed after 1954, which aimed at 
disseminating ideas of an Egypt-led Arab unity, anti-colonialism, and anti-Zionism across 
the Middle East (Barnett, 1998; James, 2006). This had a number of components: for 
one, Egypt sponsored radio programs, notably al-Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the Arabs), 
which were broadcast across the Middle East and enjoyed enormous popularity. The 
distribution of Egyptian newspapers abroad was also employed in the context of the 
Arab Cold War as an instrument of Egyptian propaganda (Kerr, 1978). Education was 
also a very important foreign policy tool, particularly in allowing Arabs to pursue degrees 
in Egypt, frequently under Egyptian state scholarships. In fact, Nasser himself made the 
connection between regional political influence and education by calling the Voice of the 
Arabs ‘an open university’ that provided ‘education in national consciousness’ (quoted in 
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Abou-El-Fadl, 2015: 232). But how was high-skilled regional emigration linked to cultural 
diplomacy? 
In Libya, Egyptian professionals promoted Nasserite ideals, particularly Arab unity and 
anti-colonialism, in a number of ways. Britain’s ambassador to Libya, Sir Alec Kirkbride, 
reported in 1954 how  
Egypt is the nearest source of supply for Arab officials, many parts of 
the Libyan administration are modelled on the Egyptian pattern and 
lastly the Egyptian Government continues to pay the salaries of 
Egyptian civil servants seconded to Libya and allows them to draw, in 
addition, the Libyan salaries attached to their posts. 
But it was Egyptian teachers that the British were worried about. Kirkbride warned that  
the most damage to British interests is being done by the considerable 
number of Egyptian teachers who are employed in the Libyan schools. 
These people are in a position to poison the mind of the rising 
generation of Libyans against the Western Powers in general and against 
Great Britain in particular. (The National Archives – FO 371/108687, 
1954). 
One example of this phenomenon is the Libyan secondary school curriculum, as 
developed and taught by Egyptian teachers: 
The presence of Egyptian teachers explains why so many classrooms 
show the influence of Egyptian propaganda. Pupils do crayon drawings 
of Egyptian troops winning victories over Israel or Britain. In Benghazi, 
Libya, a complete course in Egyptian history is given to secondary 
school students. A display in a high school art exhibit showed pictures 
of the leading rulers of Egypt; on one side were the ‘bad’ rulers, on the 
other the ‘good’ rulers. The bad rulers began with the Pharaoh Cheops, 
who enslaved his people to build the pyramids, and ended with Farouk. 
The good rulers began with the idealistic Pharaoh Ikhnaton and ended 
with, of course, Gamal Abdel Nasser (Wynn, 1959: 137). 
Nasserite cultural diplomacy across the country was aided by the fact that Libyan schools 
were using Egyptian textbooks. The seventh-grade textbooks featured a dedicated 
chapter entitled ‘I am an Arab’ that stated: ‘I am an Arab. Yes, I say it with all pride and 
happiness. I am not alone. Every Arab is my brother in language, religion, feeling and 
nationhood… Yes, I am an Arab from Libya’ (Obeidi, 1999: 37). But, importantly, 
Egyptian cultural diplomacy in Libya involved the dispatch of other professionals – the 
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Libyan labor code was drafted by Egyptian legal scholars, while the country’s first 
university, the Libyan University, was initially run by Egyptian academics (Middle East 
Report, 1961: 150). More broadly, the New York Times’ coverage of the country described 
how Libya had 
large contingents of Egyptian teachers, advisers, and government 
administrators [whose] penetration into almost every field of Libyan life 
has become a matter of Western alarm. For these Egyptians are also 
helping carry on Premier Nasser’s anti-Western campaign. There are 
almost 500 Egyptian teachers in Libyan secondary schools. (The New 
York Times, 24 May 1956) 
Beyond North Africa, Egyptians ‘played a major role in the development of the political 
and cultural consciousness of [Arab] nationalism in Bahraini society’ (Chalcraft, 2010: 8). 
Similarly, Egyptian teachers in Dubai were involved in attempts to spread Nasserite ideas 
and foster students’ political activism, as ‘many young boys were encouraged by senior 
students and expatriate staff to demonstrate in the streets while carrying banners and 
photos of Jamal Abdel Nasser’ (Davidson, 2008: 41). The diary of Donald Hawley, a 
British diplomat and writer stationed in Dubai at the time, describes in detail a variety of 
forms of Egyptian-led political activism, including the decoration of school classrooms 
with pictures of Nasser and the recitation of Nasser’s speeches. In Iraq, the government 
claimed that  
teachers were a potent factor in the spread of Nasser propaganda and 
that they helped incite youths to demonstrations that resulted in eleven 
deaths [in November 1956], mostly in Mosul. [Teachers were found to] 
have agitated against the regime by encouraging students to howl on 
streets for severance of relations with Britain and France. (The New York 
Times, 17 May 1957) 
Beyond educational staff, Egyptian professionals were recruited in ‘the Codification 
Department of the Ministry of Justice, in the Oil Affairs Department of the Ministry of 
Economics, and in the Government Oil Refineries Administration …’ (The National 
Archives – FO 481/12, 1958). 
British archival sources paint a similar picture in Kuwait, where the Director of 
Education had been Egyptian himself, until 1950 (The National Archives – FO 464/12, 
1956). In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egyptian teachers were reported to have 
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organized a countrywide boycott of foreign goods, enforced by ‘young women patrols 
(mostly Egyptian teachers) who started going round in twos and threes visiting shops and 
preaching to the shopkeepers the sin of selling to the foreigner.’ The report highlighted 
how ‘it would appear that all [women patrols] are Egyptians’ (The National Archives – 
FO 371/120558, 1956). While it is imperative that the alarmist nature of these reports be 
put into the broader historical context of decolonization and Great Britain’s concerns 
over the power of Nasser across the Arab world, multiple sources acknowledge how the 
Kuwaiti ‘education system and the social clubs [appear to be] completely Egyptian 
influenced’ (The New York Times, 15 March 1957). A British account of a sports gala 
organized in May 1957 in Minaa’ Shuweekh indicates the extent of the interplay between 
the export of Egyptian teachers and cultural diplomacy dissemination in Kuwait: it 
describes how 2100 Kuwaiti secondary school students participated in the event: 
The tune which welcomed spectators just before the gala began was that 
of the favourite song of ‘Voice of the Arabs.’ It was entitled, ‘Woe to 
the Colonisers’ … The historical tableaux which appeared in the 
program included: a representation of the battle of Port Said [in the 
context of the Suez Crisis], which took the form of a float bearing a 
boat with sailors and an effigy of a descending parachutist. The sailors 
in the boat were shooting down the parachutist. Written in large letters 
on the side of the float was: ‘Get out of my Canal’ … A physical 
training display which was the last event in the programme, consisted of 
exercises performed to the tune of a song specially composed for the 
occasion by an Egyptian inspector of education. Each verse of this song 
recalled one of the Arab states: Egypt was represented as the champion 
of Arab freedom and the repeller of the aggressors; Yemen as the 
protector of Aden who was called upon to liberate her; Syria was 
described as the home of true nationalism, while Iraqis were the subject 
of sarcastic praise for their skill in picking dates with their finger-tips … 
These points together with the lengthy displays in which hundreds of 
small boys took part with air-rifles, made this gala nearer in character to 
a military rally than to a sporting event. (The National Archives – FO 
371/126899, 1957). 
How effective was the export of high-skilled Egyptians across the Arab world in 
constituting an effective strategy of cultural diplomacy under Nasser? The difficulty of 
accurately measuring both soft power and its effects is well-established. That said, one 
indication of its effectiveness – besides the archival and media sources previously cited – 
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lies in local elites’ responses. In Libya, King Idris reportedly attempted to identify 
Egyptian teachers engaging in the dissemination of pan-Arabism by using secret police 
agents disguised as students: ‘the planting of secret police in class-rooms in secondary 
schools may seem grotesque, but it is to be remembered that many of the twenty-one and 
twenty-two year old pupils are very grown up in appearance’ a British 1965 report argues, 
concluding that 80 Egyptian teachers were duly deported, with Libya bringing in 
Tunisians instead (The National Archives – FO 371/97338). Iraqi elites employed similar 
strategies to counter Nasserism, where 25 teachers were expelled in 1957, although this 
was ‘carried out with restraint’ and without targeting higher education professionals ‘who 
are still needed’ (The New York Times, 17 May 1957). Beyond elites’ attempts at 
combatting the phenomenon, a wide variety of anecdotal data points to the soft power 
effects of Egyptian high-skilled migration on the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Arab world – 
Hawley’s memoirs include a notable event in which a group of young boys shouted at 
him on a Dubai street, in 1961: ‘Down with colonization and long live Gamal!’ (Hawley, 
2007: 116). 
 
High-skilled emigration and Egyptian development aid 
The use of high-skilled migration as an instrument of soft power did not rest solely on 
the dissemination of cultural diplomacy abroad. Across a number of host states, Egyptian 
migration diplomacy facilitated the dispersal of development aid, either in the form of 
expertise or in terms of infrastructural support. This is most evident in Egyptian 
emigration in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly across newly independent African states. 
As regime stalwart Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal declared in 1956, ‘Egypt must send 
selected missions of experts in science, religion, politics, economics, commerce and social 
services to aid the African peoples, to support them, to collaborate with them and light 
the path before them’ (Haykal, 1956). Egyptian development aid across Africa had a 
distinct foreign policy component: firstly, Egypt believed it stood to gain potential 
support at the United Nations from the newly independent African nations (Cremeans, 
1963); secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it aimed to battle the involvement of 
Israel in the continent. In 1965, Nasser wrote the following: 
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The struggle of the Asian and African peoples is not waged in isolation 
from the struggle of the Arab nation. In addition to the responsibilities 
of the development of the African continent following its liberation call 
for gigantic efforts so that imperialism should not infiltrate and return 
to it under the pressure of underdevelopment or behind a deceptive 
mask, such as the Israeli mask, which imperialism tries actively to make 
use of in Africa. (Nasser, 1966: 12) 
In terms of Israel, it was also engaged in a sustained effort to increase its visibility across 
Africa via the work of the Agency for International Development Cooperation in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MASHAV). Founded in 1958, MASHAV organized 
development projects across Africa, usually centered around three stages: (a) a survey on 
the potential development of a certain field (cooperative, institutional, agricultural, 
scientific, and so on) led, and usually funded, by Israel; (b) African citizens coming to 
Israel for a short period to study at educational institutions affiliated with MASHAV; and 
(c) a team of Israeli experts going to a given African state to complete or initiate a 
project, usually funded by the African state or through a joint venture with an Israeli 
company (Kreinin, 1964: 18). This initiative was rhetorically associated with the ancient 
Jewish concept of tikkun olam, or ‘repairing the world’ – providing a mythological source 
for an altruistic discourse of Third World empowerment, which discounted more 
immediate Israeli goals: firstly, ensuring African states’ support for Israel at the United 
Nations (where the African bloc was gaining significant voting power, given the General 
Assembly’s one-state, one-vote policy); and, secondly, strengthening ties with Western 
states, particularly the USA, by precluding African states from obtaining development 
support from the Soviet Union. 
Egyptian policy in sub-Saharan Africa came into competition with Israel. This is not to 
say that Cairo did not attempt to include cultural diplomacy aspects (for an example of 
how it engaged in anti-colonial rhetoric, see Figure 1). Mostly, however, Egypt was 
concerned with Israel’s development policy. According to the New York Times, Nasser 
was particularly keen to preclude Israeli influence across these states; as a result, ‘the 
Egyptians [made] themselves heard everywhere in Africa and play[ed] the part of self-
chosen leaders’ (The New York Times, 1 March 1956). As Haykal describes,  
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The day a newly independent African country celebrates its 
independence, a delegation arrives from Israel bringing with it a deep 
and detailed study of the problems of the country. While all other 
delegations are offering their congratulations the Israeli delegation is 
speaking about the problems [that] the newly independent country 
faces. Most delegations return home after the celebrations but the 
African ruler keeps the Israeli envoy because he can discuss post-
independence problems with him. … In many cases, an Israeli mission 
returns bearing with it economic, technical and/or cultural agreements. 
Israel usually chooses one or two fields and concentrates its activities on 
these. For example, construction is considered the easiest and profits 
are positive. Any building [that] rises in any African country continues 
to be a symbol of Israel’s activities. After comes trade and maritime 
companies, then agricultural centres. Also, Israel chooses her men in 
Africa very carefully. And its embassies in Africa are comprised of the 
most efficient men from the foreign ministry. (Arab Observer, 216, 
August 1964) 
 
 
Figure 1. African liberation (Arab Observer, 10 July 1960). 
 
Beyond Africa, Egyptian use of emigration as a form of development aid is most evident 
in the case of Yemen between 1962 and 1970. Despite Egyptians’ political activism, the 
Yemeni leader, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya, found it very difficult to send them away for he 
relied on them for the country’s development. Aiming for the institution of a 
revolutionary movement in Yemen that would align with Egypt, Nasser came into a 
protracted, direct conflict with conservative Arab leaders – particularly Saudi Arabia’s 
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King Faisal – who saw in this an attempt to destabilize the region and threaten their 
survival. The conflict in Yemen escalated into a proxy war between Egypt – or, as it was 
then called, the United Arab Republic – and Saudi Arabia (Dawisha, 1975). Beyond a 
heavy military engagement of over 60,000 soldiers, Egypt also organized the short-term 
emigration of thousands of professionals – teachers, engineers, doctors, nurses, and so 
on (Figure 2) – to the country. 
 
 
Figure 2. Egyptian nurses in Yemen (Arab Observer, 5 October 1964). 
 
Already in March 1958, Egyptian teachers had organized a crowd of 500 protesters, 
who marched to the Palace and demonstrated against the Imam. The extent to which 
these Egyptians constituted a form of soft power in the proxy war against Saudi Arabia 
became evident in Sana’a: as British sources recount, ‘all Egyptian teachers [marched] 
together with 2,000 demonstrators’ towards the Saudi Arabia Delegation in Sana’a, where 
they ‘broke into the courtyard and smashed all the windows.’ The Imam was forced to 
issue a formal apology to the Saudi King, saying ‘we are Arab brothers and must accept 
sorrow with good heart’ (The National Archives – CO 1015/1267, 1959). Yemen’s heavy 
dependence on Egyptian professionals for its development highlights the foreign policy 
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importance of Egyptian regional emigration at the time. Only a few months following the 
protest, the Imam ‘welcomed’ new Egyptian professionals in Hodeida, saying that Yemen 
was waiting for Egyptian ‘experts to start building the first Yemeni spinning and textile 
factory’ (BBC, 19 January 1959). O’ Balance explains:  
Partly because there was no alternative, Egyptians working in the 
country as military instructors, school teachers and doctors, all subtly 
and insidiously aided the spread of Nasser’s views … All this had a 
profound effect on young, restless, impressionable minds in the Yemen 
[resulting in August 1962] demonstrations in some of the secular 
schools against alleged approval by the Imam of the American bases in 
Saudi Arabia. (O’Ballance, 1971: 63) 
In late 1959, a number of different pamphlets, originating from Egypt, were intercepted 
by the British in Ta‘izz (Figure 3). They read: 
Oh sons of Yemen, the army and the people! … Do not clap for 
Gamal. O sons of Yemen whose hearts are shaken whenever Gamal is 
mentioned and whose tongues constantly speak of him. Gamal Abdel 
Nasser does not need your applause nor does he require your 
admiration … Your biggest compliment to Gamal would be when you 
united together and organise yourselves, eliminating the monarchy and 
declaring the birth of the new Yemeni People’s Republic. (The National 
Archives – CO 1015/1267, 1959) 
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Figure 3. Egyptian pamphlets intercepted in Yemen (The National Archives – CO 
1015/1267, 1959). 
 
Egypt intensified its soft power strategy in Yemen following the Imam’s death in 
September 1962. Abdullah al-Sallal, the main challenger to the Saudi-backed Yemeni 
monarchy, declared the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic and, immediately, 
‘appealed to Egypt primarily for support against potential foreign intervention, from 
Saudi Arabia or the British in Aden, and for Egyptian technical and administrative help’ 
(Tsourapas, 2016). Following al-Sallal’s appeal, ‘Egypt moved into Yemen, not only with 
tanks, jets and soldiers, but also with almost 300 primary and secondary school teachers, 
administrative advisors, doctors for the new hospitals.’ In terms of development aid as 
soft power, as the Egyptian Director of the Technical Aid Office for Yemen argued, 
[Cairo] took great care to send to Yemen the best teams and experts in 
spite of their being badly needed in [Egypt …] Experts from the … 
Ministry of Scientific Research and the Ministry of Agriculture were sent 
to Yemen … Economists and finance experts were also seconded to 
Yemen and the result was the emergence of a State Budget covering the 
expenses and revenues for a whole year; the first of its kind in the 
history of Yemen. (Quoted in Arab Observer, 5 October 1964). 
Egypt’s involvement in Yemen highlights not merely the importance of labor emigration 
as a soft power strategy, but also the degree to which soft power interacted with 
economic and military power. Dana Adams Schmidt, the New York Times’ 
correspondent, produced a detailed account of the military conflict in Yemen, while also 
paying particular attention to Egyptian soft power policy: 
I was impressed also by the extent of the Egyptians’ ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaign among the Yemenis [such as] installing water pumps, school-
teaching and providing all kinds of professional services and advice – 
agricultural, engineering and medical. These were all ways of introducing 
the Yemenis to modern life, ways in which the Egyptians could do 
things for the Yemeni people which their traditional leaders could not. 
The Egyptians had also brought 100 Egyptian ulema [Islamic scholars] 
into the country, in the hopes of persuading the Yemenis that there 
were really no important differences between the Sunnis and the Shia in 
general, and the Shaffei and Zeidi sects in particular. They may even 
have tried to persuade the Zeidis that they did not really need an Imam. 
(Schmidt, 1968: 208) 
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Conclusion 
The novel evidence presented in this article via the case study of Egypt under Nasser 
allows the reformulation of its initial hypotheses into two broader ones: first, the 
Egyptian authoritarian state was able to employ labor emigration in support of its 
cultural diplomacy strategies abroad. In fact, the targeted, state-sponsored emigration of 
Egyptian teachers contributed to the spread of ideas of pan-Arabism, anti-Zionism, and 
anti-colonialism across the Arab world. Second, high-skilled professionals’ emigration 
facilitated the dissemination of bilateral aid, particularly across African states and in 
Yemen. This goes against existing theorization of international migration politics both 
with regard to political economy accounts that expect emigration policies to be driven 
by states’ development or macroeconomic interests, as well as comparative politics 
accounts that focus on political dissenters’ emigration out of authoritarian contexts. It 
also shifts the debate within diaspora studies beyond the foreign policy component of 
state–diaspora relations, by examining the distinct process of labor emigration. Overall, 
the Egyptian case exhibits a distinct soft power component in the strategies developed 
by a major authoritarian emigration state, a component that cannot be as easily 
disassociated from economic or military power as Nye would think. Consequently, the 
workings of the Egyptian authoritarian emigration state imply an interaction of soft and 
hard power. 
The article’s two hypotheses on the foreign policy strategies of an authoritarian 
emigration state may be tested in a broader set of cases. In terms of using emigration as 
an instrument of cultural diplomacy, the Soviet Union during the Cold War dispatched 
hundreds of high-skilled Russian scientists and bureaucrats across the Eastern bloc as a 
way of contributing to host states’ development and instilling communist ideals. The 
rationale behind Moscow’s policy is arguably best understood through a foreign policy 
rather than a developmental or comparative politics lens. Similarly, Castro’s rise to power 
in Cuba spearheaded the policy of ‘medical internationalism,’ through which Cuba would 
financially support the emigration of thousands of medical staff – doctors, nurses, and so 
on – across Latin America and Africa for cultural diplomacy purposes. Egyptian and 
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Israeli use of emigration as a foreign aid component within the context of the Arab–
Israeli rivalry is reminiscent of the Cold-War-era competition between the two 
superpowers over the Third World. Similarly, there exist a number of similarities between 
intra-Arab rivalry and the competition between China and the USSR over the leadership 
of the communist world during the Cold War. In all these cases, cross-border mobility 
has been an important aspect of authoritarian emigration states’ foreign policy agendas. 
Ultimately, the article aims to contribute to an evolving research agenda on the politics of 
authoritarian emigration states. Through its inductive exploration of population mobility 
as part of an authoritarian state’s soft power strategies, it aims to bring work on soft 
power into conversation with research on the international politics of migration, and to 
shift focus away from the policies of liberal democracies. In this sense, the article aims to 
draw parallels with ongoing research on the international politics of authoritarian rule, on 
authoritarian regime export strategies, as well as work on linkage and leverage. In doing 
so, it is able to shed additional light on key matters in world politics: the rise of China as a 
global power cannot be disassociated from ‘wenhua ruan shili,’ or the cultural soft power it 
pursues in a number of ways, including the dispatch of Chinese teachers to over 500 
Confucius Institutes across the world. In the Middle East, the Iranian–Saudi competition 
also includes a transnational dimension of efforts at exerting religious influence beyond 
the two states’ borders. Similarly, Turkish foreign policy includes a soft power dimension 
in its emigration diplomacy, as the Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, trains, 
funds, and dispatches thousands of imams annually to over 2000 mosques abroad. 
Future work is needed beyond single-case studies in order to test, and modify, the 
expectations put forth in this article, and to create a more robust model of the interplay 
between authoritarian emigration and foreign policy. At the same time, empirical studies 
may be able to address additional questions raised by this article. For one, how does high-
skilled emigration fit into the broader range of soft power policies available to 
authoritarian states? For Nasserite Egypt, high-skilled emigration was only one 
component of the state’s broader soft power agenda; today, China and Turkey combine 
emigration with a number of other soft power policies, while Cuban strategy appears to 
focus on the dispatch of medical staff abroad. How effective is high-skilled emigration as 
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an instrument of authoritarian soft power? Egypt avoided dispatching professionals to 
more powerful or antagonistic states – a policy mirrored by Cuba’s export of medical 
staff to ‘friendly’ states across the Global South. Yet, Turkish emigration diplomacy is 
more extensive, sponsoring the short-term emigration of imams across Europe and 
North America. Finally, are there different ways through which authoritarian emigration 
states may employ cross-border mobility in their foreign policy agendas beyond high-
skilled emigration? Many authoritarian emigration states – Egypt, China, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia – have also developed extensive education programs offering scholarships and 
assistance to public officials and students from targeted countries. Iranian hawzas, 
seminaries for the training of Shi’a Muslim clerics in Qum and Najaf, include over 10,000 
non-Iranian students. The mechanisms and dynamics of authoritarian emigration states’ 
soft power strategies constitutes an important, underexplored field of inquiry in the study 
of world politics. 
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Record repositories and state documents 
• The National Archives, London: 
o BW114 British Council: Registered Files, Persian Gulf 
o CO 1015 Colonial Office: Central Africa and Aden: Original Correspondence 
o CO 1035 Colonial Office: Intelligence and Security Departments: Registered Files 
o FCO 39 Foreign Office, North and East African Department and Successors 
o FCO 93 Foreign Office, Near East and North African Department 
o FO 371 Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence 
o FO 464 Foreign Office: Confidential Print Arabia 
o FO 414 Foreign Office: Confidential Print North America 
o FO 481 Foreign Office: Confidential Print Iraq 
• Archives of the Department of Secondment, Egyptian Ministry of Education, Arab 
Republic of Egypt. Cairo. 
• Archives of the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Migration. Cairo. 
Media sources (in Arabic) 
• al-Ahram 
• al-Akhbar 
• al-Gumhuriya 
Media sources (in English) 
• al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt) 
• Arab Observer (Egypt) 
• British Broadcasting Corporation Radio (UK) 
• Middle East News Agency (Egypt) 
• Middle East Report (US) 
• The New York Times (US) 
 
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to thank the IPSR editorial team, the anonymous reviewers, Ibrahim Awad, 
Maysa Ayoub, Irene Fernandez-Molina, Adam Quinn, and Stefan Wolff for their help and 
feedback. Maria Koinova offered insightful comments on multiple drafts. Noam Chen-Zion 
provided expert research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
American University in Cairo, as well as in workshops held at SOAS, University of London, the 
University of Amsterdam, and the University of Birmingham. I am grateful to organizers and 
participants for their valuable feedback. 
 
Funding 
This research has been supported by the Council for British Research in the Levant, Pilot Study 
Award on ‘Migration Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean – Inter-State Politics of 
Population Mobility in the Middle East’ (2017–2018), and by funding provided by the School of 
Government and Society, University of Birmingham. 
  
Authoritarian Emigration States 
Gerasimos Tsourapas   
 
 
24 
References 
Abou-El-Fadl, Reem (2015) Neutralism Made Positive: Egyptian anti-colonialism on the 
road to Bandung. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42(2): 219–240. 
Adamson, Fiona and Gerasimos Tsourapas (2018) Migration Diplomacy in World 
Politics. International Studies Perspectives (forthcoming). 
Ahmadov, Anar K and Gwendolyn Sasse (2016) A Voice Despite Exit: The role of 
assimilation, emigrant networks, and destination in emigrants’ transnational political 
engagement. Comparative Political Studies 49(1): 78–114. 
Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2010) A History of Saudi Arabia. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Babiracki, Patryk (2015) Soviet Soft Power in Poland Culture and the Making of Stalin’s New 
Empire, 1943-1957. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 
Barnett, Michael N (1998) Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Berenksoetter, Felix and Michael J Williams (2007) Power in World Politics. London: 
Routledge. 
Chalcraft, John (2010) Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. London:  
LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf 
States. 
Collyer, Michael (ed) (2013) Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cremeans, Charles Davis (1963) The Arabs and the World: Nasser’s Arab Nationalist Policy. 
New York: Praeger. 
Davidson, Christopher M (2008) Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Dekmejian, R Hrair (1971) Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
Dessouki, Ali E Hillal (1982) The Shift in Egypt’s Migration Policy: 1952-1978. Middle 
Eastern Studies 18(1): 53–68. 
Gamlen, Alan (2008) The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination. 
Political Geography 27(8): 840–856. 
George, Alexander L and Andrew Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gerring, John (2007) Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method? Comparative Political Studies 
40(3): 231–253. 
Glasius, Marlies (2017) Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: A framework. 
Globalisations. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2017.1403781.  
Authoritarian Emigration States 
Gerasimos Tsourapas   
 
 
25 
Gordon, Joel (1992) Nasser’s Blessed Movement Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hawley, Donald (2007) The Emirates: Witness to a Metamorphosis. Wilby, Norwich: Michael 
Russell. 
Hollifield, James F (2004) The Emerging Migration State. International Migration Review 
38(3): 885–912. 
Hollifield, James F (2012) Migration and International Relations. In Marc R Rosenblum 
and Daniel J Tichenor (eds) The Oxford Handbook of The Politics of International Migration. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hourani, Albert Habib (2013) A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber & Faber. 
James, Laura M (2006) Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Jankowski, James P (2002) Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Kapur, Devesh (2010) Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of 
International Migration from India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kerr, Malcolm H (1978) The Arab Cold War: Gamal ʾabd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-
1970. 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press. 
King, Charles and Neil J Melvin (2006) Diaspora Politics: Ethnic linkages, foreign policy, 
and security in Eurasia. International Security 24(3): 108–138. 
Kirk, John M and H Michael Erisman (2009) Cuban Medical Internationalism. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Koinova, Maria (2012) Autonomy and Positionality in Diaspora Politics. International 
Political Sociology 6(1): 99–103. 
Koinova, Maria and Gerasimos Tsourapas (2018) How Do Countries of Origin Engage 
Migrants and Diasporas? Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives. International 
Political Science Review (in this special issue). 
Kreinin, Mordechai E (1964) Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Cooperation. New York: 
Praeger. 
Malyarenko, Tatyana and Stefan Wolff (2018) The logic of competitive influence-seeking: 
Russia, Ukraine, and the conflict in Donbas. Post-Soviet Affairs (forthcoming). 
Mearsheimer, John J and Stephen M Walt (2008) The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. 
London: Penguin. 
Mirilovic, Nikola (2016) Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A dyadic approach. Foreign 
Policy Analysis. DOI: 10.1093/fpa/orw038. 
Nasser GA (1966) On Africa. Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, Information 
Administration. 
Authoritarian Emigration States 
Gerasimos Tsourapas   
 
 
26 
Nye, Joseph S (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public 
Affairs. 
O’Ballance, Edgar (1971) The War in the Yemen. London: Faber. 
Obeidi, Amal (1999) Political Culture in Libya. Richmond: Curzon. 
Rahmy, Ali Abdel Rahman (1981) The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World: Intervention in 
Yemen, 1962-1967: Case Study. Geneva: University of Geneva. 
Schmidt, Brian C (2007) Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations. In Felix 
Berenskoetter and Michael J Williams (eds) Power in World Politics. London: Routledge. 
Schmidt, Dana Adams (1968) Yemen: The Unknown War. London: Bodley Head. 
Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth (2003) Diasporas and International Relations Theory. 
International Organization 57(3): 449–479. 
Tsourapas, Gerasimos (2014) Notes from the Field: Researching emigration in post-2011 
Egypt. American Political Science Association Migration & Citizenship Newsletter 2(2): 58–63. 
Tsourapas, Gerasimos (2015) Why Do States Develop Multi-Tier Emigrant Policies? 
Evidence from Egypt. Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 41(13): 2192–2214. 
Tsourapas, Gerasimos (2016) Nasser’s Educators and Agitators across al-Watan al-‘Arabi: 
Tracing the foreign policy importance of Egyptian regional migration, 1952-1967. 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43(3): 324–341. 
United Arab Republic (1964) Al-Taʻlīm Al-ʻālī : Mushkilātuh Wa-Usus Takhtītih. Cairo: 
Wizārat al-Taʻlīm al-ʻĀlī. 
Wynn, Wilton (1959) Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity. Clinton, MA: Colonial Press. 
 
Author biography 
Gerasimos Tsourapas is a Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the Department of Political 
Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, where he works on the 
politics of migration and refugee movements in the Middle East. He is currently the 
Principal Investigator in two research projects: ‘The Politics of Forced Migration in the 
Mediterranean: Interstate Bargaining and Issue-Linkage in Greece and Jordan’, funded by 
a British Academy/Leverhulme grant, and ‘Migration Diplomacy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean – Inter-State Politics of Population Mobility in the Middle East’, funded 
by the Council for British Research in the Levant. 
 
 
